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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * 
vs. * CASE NO. 900148 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, * Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. * 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code 78-2-2(3)(i), in that this case involves a conviction of 
a first degree felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should the Defendant's knife and bag of clothing, seized 
without a warrant from the trailer in which he was residing, have 
been suppressed? The standard of review is whether it clearly 
appears that the lower court was in error in its factual assessment 
underlying a decision to deny a suppression motion. State v. Ashe, 
745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987). 
2. Was the Defendant deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel when counsel, at the court's encouragement, proceeded in 
taking over the examination of witnesses from the Defendant after 
counsel stated he was not prepared to proceed? The standard of 
review is whether counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner and whether the outcome of trial would probably 
have been different but for the error. State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
645. 
3. Does the appointment of a part-time city attorney and 
prosecutor to represent an indigent defendant constitute a conflict 
of interest and deny the defendant due process? The standard of 
review is strictly a determination of constitutional law and 
judicial administration by this court. 
4. Does the prosecuting attorney's reference to Defendant and 
three co-defendants, in closing argument, as "four mad dogs" 
constitute reversible error? The standard for review is whether 
misconduct occurred and whether the jury was probably influenced 
by the remarks. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). 
5. Did the trial court err in permitting evidence of prior 
bad acts of the Defendant? The standard for review is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion. State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350 
(Utah 1985) . 
6. Did the trial court's decision to permit the jury to 
deliberate for 13 1/2 hours through the night after a full fourth 
day of trial deprive the Defendant of the full benefits of his 
right to a jury? The standard of review regarding issues of jury 
deliberation is abuse of discretion. State v. Lactad, 761 P.2d 23. 
7. Was the jury instruction regarding jury deliberation 
improper as being unduly coercive of dissenting jurors? Because 
the correctness of a jury instruction is an issue of law only, no 
deference is granted to the trial court. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 
131, 133 (Utah 1989). 
8. Was there insufficient evidence to support the conviction 
2 
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of aggravated assault on Richard Anderson? The standard of review 
is whether there is some evidence from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made. State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). 
9. Was it improper for the court to order an indigent 
Defendant to reimburse the county for all costs of defense 
including attorney's fees? The standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and rules is determinative of the issues involved: 
Issue 1. 4th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 14 of Constitution of Utah 
Issue 2. 6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah 
Issue 3. 6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah 
Issue 4. Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 3.4(e) 
A lawyer shall not: 
(e) . . . In trial, allude to any matter that the 
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or 
that will not be supported by admissible evidence, 
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except 
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal 
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the 
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a 
civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an 
accused. 
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8 
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(a) . . . 
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor 
to express his or her personal belief or opinion as 
to the truth or falsity of any testimony or 
evidence or the guilt of the defendant. 
(c) The prosecutor shall not use arguments 
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of 
the jury. 
Issue 5. Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the 
same; 
(2) . . . 
(3) . . . 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. 
Rule 405, Utah Rules of Evidence 
Methods of Proving Character 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which 
evidence of character or a trait of character of a 
person is admissible, proof may be made by 
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the 
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry 
is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in 
which character or a trait of character of a person 
is essential element of a charge, claim, or 
defense, proof may also be made of specific 
4 
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instances of his conduct. 
Issue 6. 6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah 
Issue 7. 6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah 
Issue 8. Utah Code 76-5-103 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he 
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and 
he: 
(a) . . . 
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily 
injury. 
Utah Code 76-5-102 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) . . . 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another; or 
(c) . . . 
Utah Code 76-10-506 
Every person, except those persons described in 
Section 76-10-503, who, not in necessary self 
defense in the presence of two or more persons, 
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry 
and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same 
in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Issue 9. Utah Code 77-32a-3 
The court shall not include in the judgment a 
sentence that a defendant pay costs unless the 
defendant is or will be able to pay them. In 
determining the amount and method of payment of 
costs, the court shall take account of the 
5 
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financial resources of the defendant and the nature 
of the burden that payment of costs will impose and 
that restitution be the first priority. 
6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution 
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
According to Eddie Apadaca, one of the State's three 
eyewitnesses, the Defendant, along with eight other employees, in 
the evening of October 25, 1989, were in the camp of the Western 
Brine Shrimp Company on the northwestern side of the Great Salt 
Lake. During the late evening hours, one of the crew, William 
Cummins, who stayed in trailer number three with Billy Cayer and 
the Defendant, went to trailer number two and asked Eddie Apadaca 
to come over to his trailer to talk. A roommate of his, Cabututan 
was already there. Cummins accused him of telling Don Brown, the 
Defendant, who had been with the crew approximately a week, that 
he was a foreman. All four in the trailer had had some alcohol to 
drink. Another member of the crew, from his own trailer, Ray 
Cabututan got upset with him for not having helped him with some 
work, started hitting him, and threw a sharpening stone at him, 
hitting him on the head. 
Eddie ran back to his trailer. A short time later, Cayer, 
Cummins, Cabututan, and Defendant went to trailer number two. 
Cabututan had nunchukas. Mike, the victim, jumped between Eddie 
and the four who entered. Cummins said to get the hunting knife 
from Mike's pocket. Michael was pushed back and drew his knife (T 
6 
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211:113). At that time, Brown, the Defendant, had a knife out also 
(T 211:17). Mike dropped his knife and Defendant folded his up and 
put it away. The Defendant, Cummins and Cabututan escorted Mike 
out of the trailer. Cayer remained with Apadaca. 
Cayer swung at Apadaca a few times until the Defendant came 
back in, told Cayer to leave him alone and then told Apadaca to get 
his things and leave. Meanwhile, Cabututan had come in and taken 
Mike's knife from the bed and left. 
When he exited trailer number two, Apadaca saw Mike on the 
ground in front of the door and Cummins and Cabututan kicking and 
hitting him (T 218:14-17). Cayer was a short ways away. Cummins 
struck Apadaca as he came out and knocked him down (T 219:4), and 
when he got up Cabututan stepped in front of him with a crescent 
wrench in his hand (T 220:3-10). He ran out of camp, and part way 
up a hill, glanced back and could see Mike still lying on the 
ground with people around him but couldn't tell how many (T 222:4-
8). The only light was from windows of the trailers. He kept 
running. In the morning, he saw Anderson & Galardo and rode back 
to near the camp with them to wait for law enforcement officers to 
arrive. 
According to Richard Anderson, who shared trailer number one 
with Galardo and Tilley, he was awakened that night, put on his 
clothes and looked out the door (T 314:22). When he opened the 
door, he saw one man on the ground and four men around him. The 
Defendant, holding the crescent wrench, pulled his hand back and 
asked him if he wanted some of it too (T 319:10-13). Anderson 
7 
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stepped back in, shut the door and had a discussion with his three 
roommates. 
After reopening the door, he saw Cabututan attempt to stab 
Mike with a knife and then hit him in the head with the crescent 
wrench (T 327:23-25). He saw Cabututan, Cummins and the Defendant 
hit and kick him. He didn't see Defendant at any time with a knife 
or hit Mike with the wrench. He admitted that at preliminary 
hearing he had said he saw silhouettes around the man on the ground 
(T 414:18-23). 
After the fight, Mike got up, went into his trailer and washed 
himself off. Early the next morning, Anderson heard a knock on the 
door. Mike was sitting on a pallet outside the door, asked them 
to call 911, that he couldn't breathe and wanted a drink of water. 
After a drink of water, he collapsed and died. 
Eric Tilley, the third State's eyewitness, also looked out the 
south door of trailer one (T 482:8) saw Mike on the ground with 
three persons around him, Cayer and Cabututan, and the third being 
either Cummins or the Defendant, but uncertain. Cummins and 
Defendant had similar physical characteristics (T 483:5-14). 
According to him, and contrary to Anderson, the door of the trailer 
was shut after that and he didn't see any more of the fight. Also, 
contrary to Anderson, the fight lasted 10 to 15 minutes (T 490:3) 
rather than 45 minutes and he went to the south end of the trailer 
when Richard reopened the door (T 491:3-5) . The fight was over and 
Mike was standing there. 
The Defendant testified that he went over to where Cummins and 
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Mike were fighting and Cummins asked him to get Mike's knife, and 
he went down but couldn't find it (T 801:9-14). Cabututan had the 
crescent wrench and had jumped in and was hitting and kicking Mike 
(T 802:18-21). He broke up the fight by dragging Cummins off of 
Mike (T 803:10-21). The fight started because Cummins was upset 
about Mike having cut his buddy, Cayer, with his knife (T 801:14-
24), a matter substantiated by Apadaca (T 283:11-19). 
According to the medical examiner, the cause of death was 
multiple blunt force injuries to the head and torso (T 538:5). Two 
of the injuries were with a wrench (T 538:15). There were also 
three cuts. There was no specific injury that could be identified 
as the lethal blow (T 549:2). 
The Defendant together with Cummins, Cabututan, and Cayer were 
arrested and removed from camp. Thereafter, a search of 
Defendant's trailer was made at which time a pink laundry bag 
containing a pants and shirt of his were seized. The next day, his 
folding knife in the same trailer was seized. Both seizures 
occurred without a warrant. A state lab serologist testified that 
the pants and shirt both showed positive indications of blood but 
insufficient for further identification (T 622:13-14). The knife 
likewise had indications of blood but insufficient for further 
identification (T 649:1-4). The boots taken from Defendant when 
he was arrested tested positive for human blood but could not be 
typed (T 631:5-10). Clothing of other defendants showed antigens 
consistent with the victims blood type. The defense introduced a 
picture taken a day after the arrest showing a cut to one of 
9 
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Defendant's fingers which Defendant sustained earlier the day of 
the fight while loading shrimp eggs (T 781:25-783:25). 
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
evidence and a motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney. The 
first motion was denied and the latter was granted with the 
appointed attorney available for assistance. The trials of the co-
defendants were severed with Defendant's case being tried last. 
During the trial, when the Defendant experienced great difficulty 
in cross-examining the State's witnesses, counsel was requested to 
proceed with the cross-examination and the rest of the trail. The 
jury deliberated for 13 1/2 hours after a full fourth day of trial 
despite counsel's request that they be permitted to rest. The 
Defendant was found guilty of second degree homicide of Mike 
Ramirez and aggravated assault of Richard Anderson. From 
conviction of those charges he has appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant's knife and bag of clothing, seized after his 
arrest without a warrant, should have been suppressed. 
II. The Defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel when counsel proceeded in taking over the examination of 
the witnesses from the Defendant despite stating that he was not 
prepared to proceed. 
III. The appointment of a part-time city attorney and 
prosecutor to represent the Defendant constitutes a conflict of 
interest and denied the Defendant due process. 
10 
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IV. The prosecuting attorney's misconduct in referring to the 
Defendant, and three co-defendants, in closing argument as "four 
mad dogs" constitutes reversible error. 
V. The trial court erred in permitting evidence of prior bad 
acts of the Defendant. 
VI. The trial court's decision to permit the jury to 
deliberate for 13 1/2 hours through the night after a full fourth 
day of the trial deprived the Defendant of the full benefits of his 
right to a jury. 
VII. Jury instruction 50 was unduly coercive in encouraging 
dissenting jurors to compromise a conviction. 
VIII. There was insufficient evidence to support the conviction 
of an aggravated assault on Richard Anderson. 
IX. It was improper for the court to order an indigent 
Defendant to reimburse the county for all costs of defense 
including attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S KNIFE AND BAG OF CLOTHING, SEIZED AFTER HIS ARREST 
WITHOUT A WARRANT, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
The Defendant and three co-defendants were arrested October 
26, 1989 and handcuffed at 8:35 AM (T(A) (suppression hearing on 
January 24), p. 23:7). They were placed in a trailer different 
from the one in which they'd been living and kept there until a 
jail van took them at 11:15 AM (T(A)22-23). Several officers 
initially went through trailer number three but no weapons were 
11 
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observed (T(A)17:4). Officers at two other times entered that 
trailer to get medicine and cigarettes for the prisoners (T(A)18 
& 75). The trailer was entered two more times, once to obtain a 
ground to ground radio to communicate with one of the owner's of 
the business enterprise and trailer who lived in Salt Lake City and 
the second time for a thorough search of the premises at which time 
a pink bag belonging to the Defendant was seized (T(A)81:3). The 
bag contained Defendant's clothing including a pair of pants and 
a sweatshirt and both had "positive indications" of blood but there 
was no identification as to whether it was human or as to type (T. 
622). 
There were four trailers on the premises. Trailer number 
three was stipulated to be the trailer that was the living quarters 
of three of the co-defendants, Cummins, Cayer, and Brown, and in 
which they kept their personal property (T(A)40). Perishable food 
items were primarily kept in the refrigerator in trailer three 
(T(A)65:25) for all the residents of the camp and the ground to 
ground radios were kept there (T(A)64:5) but the common practice 
was to knock before going in someone else's trailer (T(A)66:13), 
there was a privacy interest (T(A)66:17), and they wouldn't go in 
someone else's trailer unless they were there (T(A)70:9). 
Prior to the search, the officers contacted Mr. Bentzley in 
Salt Lake City by radio, who gave them permission to search the 
premises (T(A)83:13). The search was conducted at approximately 
1:00 PM (T(A)43:8). During the earlier entries into the trailer, 
the officers had specifically observed, among those items 
12 
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eventually seized, a pasteboard box with blood on it, tennis shoes, 
a crescent wrench, and hip waders (T(A)29:17-30:11 and 75:16-
76:22). The pink bag with clothing and white folding knife, one 
of three knives found and seized at the scene, were not identified 
as having been observed prior to the thorough search conducted that 
afternoon. This particular knife was observed and examined during 
the search (T(A)82) but wasn't retrieved until the next day 
(T(A)94:6). The prosecutor admitted that no warrant was used 
(T(A)5:8). Nor was any magistrate ever called about obtaining a 
search warrant (T(A)94:9-11). 
The trial court denied the motion to suppress on three bases. 
That the search and seizure had been: 1) incident to an arrest 
(T(A)119-120), 2) exigent circumstances of distance, a homicide, 
dissipation of blood, access of other employees to the premises, 
rain and snow nearby, and a great deal of agitation and distress 
(T(A) 120-121), 3) plain view (T(A)121), and 4) consent by the owner 
(T(A)122) . 
The warrantless search should not have been sustained on any 
of these four grounds. It can't be justified as incident to the 
arrest. The prisoners were arrested and handcuffed and placed in 
a separate trailer 4 1/2 hours before the search was conducted and 
were taken from the scene by a jail van at least 1 1/2 hours 
beforehand. A search for weapons had already been performed. 
Nor can the search be sustained on the basis of exigent 
circumstances. None of the circumstances articulated by the trial 
judge were such as to make a search without a warrant imperative. 
13 
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While there was a substantial distance to town, the jail van had 
been called out to the scene, a co-owner of the enterprise had been 
contacted and no showing was made that a warrant could not have 
been obtained. The fact of a homicide having been committed or any 
agitation or distress it may have caused the officers has never 
been viewed as circumstances in and of themselves excusing the 
requirement of a search warrant. No showing was made that blood 
dissipates more quickly than the time required to secure a warrant, 
employee access to trailer three could have been restricted by one 
or more of the numerous officers at the scene, and there was no 
showing that the wet weather conditions would have affected any of 
the contents of the trailer. 
These "exigent circumstances" are certainly not of the type 
recognized in State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) where there 
was an expectation that a drug transaction would be completed 
within minutes, a person looked out a window as the officers 
approached and the court concluded that the officers were not in 
a position to secure a warrant. 
The exceptions are "xjealously and carefully drawn,' 
and there must be a v showing by those who seek exemption 
. .. that the exigencies of the situation made [the 
search] imperative.'" 
State v. Ashe, at 1258 quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed 2d 564. 
In this particular case, a telephone search warrant was not 
attempted. The availability of such warrants under Utah Code 77-
23-4(2) in this state makes this case similar to that of State v. 
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988) where there was sufficient 
14 
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time to obtain such a warrant but no attempt was made to do so. 
The trial court further justifies the warrantless search under 
the plain view doctrine. The Defendant concedes for the sake of 
argument that the earlier entries were valid for weapons searchf 
obtaining medication and cigarettes at request of the occupantsf 
and to obtain a ground radio. However, of the items seized, only 
a cardboard box with blood, tennis shoes, crescent wrench, and hip 
waders had been noted by the officers and not the items identified 
with the Defendant, the pink clothes bag and folding knife. These 
were not observed until the subsequent entry made specifically for 
the purpose of search and seizure of evidence. Only the four items 
observed by the officers during their earlier entries into the 
trailer would be permitted under the plain view exception to the 
search warrant requirement. State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 
1986). 
Further, as to the knife seized the following day, Kelly makes 
clear in footnote 1 that plain view may not be used as a pretext 
for a warrantless search and seizure where the officers know in 
advance that an item will be present and use that knowledge as 
justification for a warrantless search and seizure. 
Finally, the justification of consent must fail. The trailer 
was the residence of the Defendant and two of the co-defendants. 
Though in terms of employment, the relationship between the owner 
and the Defendant was employer-employee, the relationship with 
regard to the trailer was one of land-lord tenant. The general 
rule, recognized in State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967) is that 
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the consent of an owner or landlordf is not sufficient to justify 
a warrantless search of the tenant's residence. 
Though trailer number three was also used to store perishable 
foods for other members of the crew and the ground to ground 
radios, State's witness Anderson testified that there was a privacy 
interest, the common practice was to knock before going in and that 
they wouldn't go in someone else's trailer unless they were there. 
The rule requiring a warrant is not otherwise merely because 
the lessor has by express agreement or by implication reserved a 
right to enter for some special or limited purpose. State v. 
Johnson, 701 P.2d 239, aff'd 716 P.2d 1288 (Id. 1985). 
An owner who stores goods on premises may have an implied 
consent to enter at reasonable times to exercise dominion over 
goods but that does not give the owner carte blanche to consent to 
a police search of the premises. People v. Escudero, 592 P.2d 312 
(Cal. 1979). 
The seizure of the Defendant's clothes bag with the pants and 
shirt therein and his folding knife should have been suppressed 
under either the state or the federal constitutions. 
II. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL PROCEEDED IN TAKING OVER THE EXAMINATION OF 
THE WITNESSES FROM THE DEFENDANT DESPITE STATING THAT HE WAS NOT 
PREPARED TO PROCEED. 
The Defendant filed a Motion For Dismissal of Attorney 
(Addendum, Exhibit A) a week before trial on February 5, 1990. At 
a hearing on that Motion on February 8, Mr. Willmore, the court-
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appointed attorney, stated that the breakdown in the relationship 
began with disagreement over certain defenses. "I felt that Mr. 
Brown shouldn't and then Mr. Brown made the decision that he wanted 
to do it this way, in his way, and that's it." (T(B)(Feb. 8 
hearing), 13:18-21). The Defendant stated he wanted to act as his 
own attorney (T(B)14:15-19). After further questioning, the court 
granted Defendant's Motion but required that Mr. Willmore be 
available during trial for consultation and assist on the selection 
of the jury (T(B)22:1-14). The Defendant further requested that 
Mr. Willmore make the opening statement and closing argument for 
him (T(B)26:24-25). 
During the course of the trial, the Defendant at times had 
difficulty conducting the cross-examination of the State's first 
witness, Eddie Apadaca (Example: T 255-256). He was quite 
ineffective in cross-examining the next witness, Richard Anderson, 
gave up in his attempt at cross-examination, and Mr. Willmore asked 
permission to ask further questions in areas not yet covered (T 
386:4-8). During the ensuing conference in chambers, the court 
granted permission for the trial to be turned over to Tom Willmore 
(T 397). However, the court asked him if he was prepared to 
proceed. He responded, "I wasn't prepared to question Richard 
Anderson and Eric Tilley, but I will do it." (T 397:23-25). The 
court mentions that Willmore was at the preliminary hearing and has 
a transcript. Willmore responded: "I've gone over it all, but as 
far as being prepared to the point where I normally am, what I 
would like to be, I am not. But I will go ahead, if that's what 
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Don wants." (T 398:6-9). Neither the court nor Willmore suggested 
a recess despite Willmore's statement of inadequate preparation for 
these suddenly changed circumstances and court immediately went 
back into session. 
There was a need for we 11-prepared, close, and extensive 
cross-examination of the three state's witnesses who had been 
members of the crew at the camp. Substantial discrepancies between 
the witnesses as to Defendant's degree of involvement in the fight 
had been developed in an extensive preliminary hearing, the 
transcript of which filled four volumes and 949 pages. This was 
in addition to voluminous hand written statements and transcribed 
interviews of each of these witnesses and partial transcriptions 
of their testimony at the trials of the co-defendants that preceded 
Defendant's. 
The exact conduct of the Defendant observed by these 
witnesses, the opportunity to observe from distances, in dim 
lighting, with lines of sight cut off by doorways and trailers, and 
the point in time in the progress of the fight in which any conduct 
of Defendant's was observed were crucial to Defendant's claim of 
peripheral involvement in the altercation of trying to locate and 
take from the victim a knife he was purportedly carrying and that 
if he was guilty of anything, it should have been of one of the 
lesser included offenses. 
The Defendant further alleges that due to lack of sufficient 
preparation and despite Defendant's request, counsel declined to 
call one of the co-defendants, Ray Cabututan, as a witness. In his 
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own earlier trial, Cabututan had testified: "I had the wrench. 
Nobody had the wrench but me. You know, that's what they're 
fabricating." (Addendum, Exhibit B. p. 270 of Cabututan's trial 
transcript). Cabututan, in his trial, had alleged self-defense 
with the wrench when attacked by the victim with a knife. 
In evaluating the issue of adequacy of counsel under these 
circumstances, it should first be emphasized that this was not a 
case where the Defendant was manipulating his right to counsel for 
purposes of delay and disruption. State v. Johnson, 651 P. 2d 247 
(Wash. App. 1982). It appears that the Defendant had some basic 
disagreements with his counsel as to what defenses should be 
presented and he felt he could do a better job in getting his point 
of view across. He fell flat on his face and his attorney was 
unprepared to step in at that precise moment. The trial should 
have been adjourned, at least until the next day, to permit his 
counsel to make adequate preparation. The constitutional right to 
have the assistance of counsel carries with it a reasonable time 
for consultation and preparation. State v. Barker, 667 P. 2d 108 
(Wash. App. 1983). 
Murder in the second degree requires a showing of an intent 
to cause serious bodily injury or, with depraved indifference 
knowingly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death. 
The Defendant was entitled to and obtained instructions on the 
lesser included offenses of manslaughter, negligent homicide, 
aggravated assault, and assault. Careful, well-prepared cross-
examination would probably have shown that at most, the Defendant's 
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conduct was reckless, if aware of the risk of death, hence 
manslaughter, or was an intentional infliction of serious bodily 
injury, hence aggravated assault. Had Cabututan been called, his 
testimony regarding his sole possession of the wrench during the 
fight would probably have affected the verdict on the homicide 
charge and exonerated the Defendant on the charge of aggravated 
assault against Anderson. 
Regardless of the Defendant's role in placing his counsel in 
the awkward position of having to proceed immediately though ill-
prepared to do so, the Defendant has been deprived of effective 
assistance of counsel if counsel rendered a deficient performance 
in some demonstrable manner and the outcome of trial would probably 
have been different but for the error. State v. Geary, 707 P. 2d 
645. In this case, the error was in counsel failing to ask for 
adjournment to be able to make adequate preparation despite the 
court's encouragement to immediately go forward as well as the 
court requiring counsel to immediately proceed. 
III. 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A PART-TIME CITY ATTORNEY AND PROSECUTOR 
TO REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTES A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND 
DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS. 
Prior to trial, the Defendant felt that Thomas Willmore was 
not representing his best interests and filed a pro se Motion For 
Dismissal of Attorney (Ct. Red. 242-245). While Mr. Willmore's 
status as a city attorney and prosecutor was not stated in the 
motion and was probably unknown to the Defendant at the time, that 
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situation came to light during the selection of the jury. 
During the questioning of Mr. Munns, Mr. Willmore identifies 
himself as the prosecutor for Garland City and that the prior year 
he prosecuted a member of Mr. Munns family and then proceeded to 
inquire if Mr. Munns had any ill feelings towards him (T. 84-86). 
It does not appear that the Utah courts have addressed the 
issue of whether a city prosecuting attorney can or should 
represent a defendant being prosecuted by the county or state. 
While courts have been unanimous in prohibiting a prosecutor from 
defending a client from prosecution by the same governmental entity 
that he is employed by, there is also some authority that part-
time prosecutors for state governmental subdivisions should also 
not be defending criminal cases. Professional Responsibility of 
the Criminal Lawyer, John Wesley Hall, Jr., 1987, The Lawyer's 
Cooperative Publishing Company, p. 405; Howerton v. State, 640 P.2d 
566 (Okl. Crim. 1982) . 
Among the reasons stated in Goodman v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905 
(4th Cir. 1965) for reversal of a conviction where a part-time 
district attorney was appointed to represent an indigent defendant 
was that effective representation may mandate attacking state laws 
which it is prosecutor's function and perhaps sworn duty to uphold, 
and may require an attack on methods used by law enforcement which 
he seeks to enforce and justify in the prosecution function. These 
conflicts are as real whether the attorney works for the state, a 
county, or a municipality. 
An additional problem, not stated in Goodman is the appearance 
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of a conflict to the unsophisticated lay defendant. At a minimum, 
the employment in a prosecutorial capacity should be disclosed to 
the defendant in advance so that he can make a reasoned decision. 
While it is impossible for the Defendant to prove that if 
Thomas Willmore was not employed as city attorney and prosecutor 
for Garland City, he would have provided more effective assistance 
of counsel, he does assert that such may have been a factor in some 
of the deficiencies pointed out in his Motion For Dismissal of 
Attorney (Addendum, Exhibit A). 
IV. 
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT IN REFERRING TO THE 
DEFENDANT, AND THREE CO-DEFENDANTS, IN CLOSING ARGUMENT AS "FOUR 
MAD DOGS" CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The prosecuting attorney, in closing argument, stated as 
follows: "There isn't one of us here who knows how he would react 
in a situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on 
somebody. (T. 911:20-22) Objection was made by defense counsel. 
(T. 912:2) Use of this inflammatory language was in derogation of 
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 3.4(e), which 
prohibits the prosecuting attorney from making expressions of 
personal opinion of guilt and the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal 
Justice 3 - 5.8 (2d ed. 1982) which prohibits the same as well as 
use of argument "calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices 
of the jury." 
The leading Utah cases dealing with prosecutorial misconduct 
provide a two-step evaluation process; whether misconduct occurred 
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and whether the jury was probably influenced by the remarks. State 
v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1984), State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422 
(Ut. 1973)- The use of the epithet, "four mad dogs", while not 
repeated is the type of phrase that penetrates the mind and 
understanding of a listener and is specifically designed to inflame 
the passions or prejudices of the jury- It is a stronger term than 
the terms "crud" and "child molester" in Patterson v. State, 747 
P.2d 535 (Alaska 1987) and "yo-yo", "stupid", "thief" and "crook" 
in State v. Diaz, 668 P.2d 326 (N.M. App. 1983). Nor need bad 
faith be shown. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1255 (Ut. 1988). Step 
one is clearly met. 
As to step two, the jury was probably influenced by the 
remark. State v. Troy, 688 P. 2d 483, 486, points out that in a 
case with less compelling proof, such as this, the Court will more 
closely scrutinize the conduct, and that if there is conflicting 
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, 
"there is a greater likelihood that they [the jury] will be 
improperly influenced through remarks of counsel. 
The degree of Defendant's involvement in the assault on the 
deceased was strongly in dispute in this case, with the testimony 
of three State's eye-witnesses varying greatly, and the Defendant's 
conduct being susceptible to many interpretations represented by 
a full range of lesser included offenses submitted to the jury. 
The final conclusion of the jury after 13 1/2 straight hours of 
deliberation through the night could, in the exhaustion of the 
morning hours, have been swayed by this mind-grabbing label put 
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forth by the prosecutor. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS 
OF THE DEFENDANT. 
During the redirect examination of one of the State's 
witnesses, Richard Anderson, the court permitted the prosecuting 
attorney, over defense counsel's objection, to inquire as to an 
alleged statement of the Defendant exhibiting belligerency by the 
Defendant toward a member of the crew other than the victim of the 
assault in this case. That evidence was offered to prove the 
aggressive character of the Defendant and is prohibited under Rules 
404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The testimony elicited was as follows: 
Q. And do you recall what Brown [Defendant] told you 
regarding that altercation? [T. 432:18] . . .[objection 
interposed] 
A. He was - his - his statement was, I'd like to see Mr. 
- or Ed take a dip in the lake and not come back up. [T. 
433:9] 
Q. Okay. And do you recall approximately when that was? 
A. No. Earlier in the week or something. You know, 
Monday or Tuesday or somewhere around there. 
This testimony was permitted by the Court because the 
Defendant, acting pro se, had earlier asked this same witness, on 
cross-examination: 
Q. Have you ever - have you ever seen at any time out 
there when working with Don Brown that he ever became 
belligerent or had any trouble with anybody? Irm talking 
about Don Brown. I'm not talking about they or them. 
A. He had a problem with one of the workers. Ed. [T. 
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377:21-25] [Thereafter Defendant confers with his court-
appointed attorney and drops this line of questioning.] 
Under Rule 404(a)(1), evidence of a pertinent trait of the 
accused's character can be offered by the prosecution only to rebut 
evidence of the same offered by the accused. The Defendant was 
notably unsuccessful in his attempt to elicit evidence of his 
peacefulness from this State's witness so that there was no 
character evidence to rebut. Nor was the character of the 
Defendant an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense 
permitting such evidence under Rule 404(b). State v. Miller, 709 
P.2d 350 (Ut. 1985). 
Even if character evidence would be permissible under Rule 
404, such evidence would have to be limited to reputation or 
opinion. Under Rule 405(a) inquiry as to specific instances is 
permitted only on cross-examination, not on re-direct. Nor would 
such method of proving character be admissible under Rule 405(b) 
where the character trait of the defendant was not an essential 
element of a charge, claim or defense. State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 
350 (Ut. 1985). 
In this case the trial court misperceived Rule 404 to permit 
evidence of specific instances of Defendant's conduct even where 
there was no evidence to rebut, permitting the prosecutor to use 
the Defendant's blundering attempts at cross-examination as a 
pretext. 
Nor is this harmless error given the Defendant's minimal 
participation in the assault, if any, compared to the two primary 
protagonists, William Cummins and Ray Cabututan, the jury's lengthy 
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deliberation of 13 1/2 hours, and the highly prejudicial nature of 
the alleged statement. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT THE JURY TO 
DELIBERATE FOR 13 1/2 HOURS THROUGH THE NIGHT AFTER A FULL FOURTH 
DAY OF THE TRIAL DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF HIS 
RIGHT TO A JURY. 
The jury began its deliberation at approximately 5:15 PM on 
the fourth day of the trial. (T. 940:2) At 3:35 AM defense counsel 
made a motion that the jury be allowed to rest and come back in the 
morning on the grounds that they'd been deliberating for 10 hours 
after a full day of trial and must be tired. The prosecutor 
objected to them being separated and suggested the court would have 
to place them in a motel. The court denied the motion but said 
he'd find out if they'd arrived at a verdict. (T. 942-943) 
An hour later, at 4:30 AM, the court convened and the bailiff 
reported the jury had said they were moving along and shouldn't be 
much longer. At 6:45 AM the jury returned with a verdict of guilty 
as charged. 
The Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury which includes 
an independent decision by each of the jurors as to the Defendant's 
guilt or innocence. While the court is given wide discretion 
regarding the length of deliberation, that discretion is abused if 
the Defendant is deprived of the considered judgment of each juror. 
To believe that the entire jury could remain engaged in the 
deliberation process for 13 1/2 hours after a full fourth day of 
the trial stretches credulity. It is unreasonable to believe that 
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all the jurors could have remained alert for that length of time. 
The memory and analytical skills of the jurors would certainly 
begin to fade and the wills of any minority jurors would be easily 
overborne after that length of time. To merely inquire after ten 
hours if the jury had a verdict and continue the process for an 
additional three hours, upon word from the bailiff that they were 
moving along and shouldn't be much longer, is to give too much 
deference to those on the jury that wanted to get the job over and 
done with at the expense of the Defendant. 
In Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), where the jury, 
in a manslaughter trial, deliberated from approximately 3:30 PM to 
10:30 PM after 1 1/2 days of hearing the trial of the case, where 
several jurors expressed a desire to recess deliberations, and 
where the trial court sent the jury back for further deliberations, 
at which time the jury returned a verdict in about 30 minutes, the 
time for continuous deliberation was held to be excessive. 
This court should hold as a matter of judicial administration 
if not Constitutional law, that keeping a jury in deliberation 
continuously for 13 1/2 hours after a full day of trial deprives 
the Defendant of due process and fair trial by jury under the state 
and federal Constitutions. 
VII. 
JURY INSTRUCTION 50 WAS UNDULY COERCIVE IN ENCOURAGING 
DISSENTING JURORS TO COMPROMISE A CONVICTION. 
The instruction to the jury on the matters of their 
deliberation and returning a unanimous verdict included the 
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following language: 
A dissenting Juror should consider whether their state 
of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no impressions 
on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest, equally 
intelligent, who have heard the same evidence, with an 
equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction 
of the same oath. 
(Ct. Red. 417) (Addendum, Exhibit C). 
The court should have given Defendant's proposed instructions, 
p. 30 and 31 (Court Record 304 and 305) which present the duties 
of the jury, particularly dissenting members, in a much less 
coercive, and hence, fairer manner. The language in the trial 
court's instruction violated the Defendant's right to jury under 
both the Federal and State Constitutions and is in derogation of 
the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Trial, Section 5.4(a) which s€*ts 
out a proper instruction to the jury before they begin 
deliberation. (Addendum, Exhibit F) . The court's instruction 
improperly focuses on a dissenting juror at the very beginning of 
deliberation, states perhaps incorrectly that the opinion of a 
dissenting juror has made no impression on the other jurors, and 
gives a directive, in the nature of a presumption, that all jurors 
are to be regarded as equally honest and intelligent with equal 
desire to arrive at the truth. 
Such an Allen instruction, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 
492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896), has no place at the 
beginning of deliberations and probably should not even be given 
later in circumstances of a hung jury. It encourages jurors with 
an initial minority opinion to more readily surrender that opinion 
and deprives the Defendant of the benefit of the convictions of 
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each individual juror. 
The Utah courts have not yet decided whether a trial court is 
ever entitled to give an Allen-type instruction. In State v. 
Thomas, 777 P. 2d 445, the supplemental oral instructions didn't 
come close and in State v. Medina, 738 P. 2d 1021 (Ut. 1987) no 
objection was made to the supplemental instructions. However, 
Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring opinion in State v. Thomas, says 
that the question of whether the giving of an Allen instruction is 
proper under the Utah Constitution or should be permitted as a 
matter of judicial administration remains open. (p. 451). The 
coercive instruction given here should be held to have been 
improper under both state and federal law and not mere harmless 
error, given the 13 1/2 hour deliberation of the jury. 
VIII. 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF 
AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON RICHARD ANDERSON. 
The evidence of aggravated assault came solely from the 
testimony of Richard Anderson. While Defendant denies his 
allegations, this issue must be examined in light of his testimony. 
He testified that he heard some noise outside his trailer, put on 
his clothes, opened the door and saw a man some distance away on 
the ground with four men around him, one of them being the 
Defendant. Although the distance from the door is not clear, the 
man on the ground, Mike, was not just outside that door (T. 372:14-
17) but near the pallet at the door of a neighboring trailer (T. 
373:23-374:1) and was between Anderson and the other four. (T. 
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374:23-24). Anderson started to step out and Defendant pulled his 
hand back with a crescent wrench in it, took one step, and said, 
"Do you want some of it, too?" Anderson stepped back in the 
trailer. (T. 319:10-14). 
Utah Criminal Code 76-5-103 provides, in relevant part, that 
a person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault and uses 
a dangerous weapon. While conceding that a crescent wrench may 
constitute a dangerous weapon, an assault has not been shown. 
Of the three types of assault, the Defendant was charged in 
the Information (Ct. Red. 3) (Addendum, Exhibit G) with alternative 
(b) of 76-5-102 which provides: 
(1) Assault is : 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another ... 
The alleged conduct of the Defendant fails to establish "a 
show of immediate force or violence". This element necessarily 
requires close proximity and an overt act on the Defendant's part. 
See Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, Section 22. The Defendant's 
conduct in State v. Verdin, 595 P. 2d 862 (Ut. 1979) which 
distinguished his conduct from that prohibited by 76-10-506, 
Threatening With or Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, was 
that he attempted to pull the trigger of a firearm and declared an 
intention to "smoke" the officer. The conditional threat made at 
a distance in the instant case while pulling back a hand with a 
crescent wrench in it does not constitute "a show of immediate 
force or violence" so as to distinguish it from the misdemeanor of 
Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon under 76-10-506. 
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IX. 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE COURT TO ORDER AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT 
TO REIMBURSE THE COUNTY FOR ALL COSTS OF DEFENSE INCLUDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Rules 7(4)(e) and 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provide for appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant. Utah 
Code 77-32a-3 provides that in determining costs, the court shall 
take into consideration the financial resources of the Defendant 
and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. 
The court, after imposing a sentence of five years to life, 
ordered the Defendant to pay all costs including attorney's fees 
and restitution to the family of the deceased (T 953-955). No 
consideration was given to his lack of financial resources for the 
foreseeable future in prison. Such a sentence constitutes an abuse 
of discretion. It seeks to impose such an extreme burden while 
Defendant is in prison, or afterwards while on parole as to have 
a chilling effect on the Defendant or any other Defendant seeking 
appointment of counsel pursuant to their constitutional right to 
representation. 
This case is to be distinguished from those involving 
probation where the Defendant has or is expected to secure 
employment after taking into account the Defendant's probable 
ability to pay. The order was contrary to the provisions of the 
Utah Code and in derogation of his rights to counsel under the 
state and federal Constitutions. 
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CONCLUSION 
This court should remand the case to district court for a new 
trial on the homicide charge. The aggravated assault charge should 
be reduced to the offense of Threatening With or Using Dangerous 
Weapon in Fight or Quarrel or dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October, 1990. 
Nathan Hult ' 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
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Nathan Hult 
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II EXHIBIT 6 
£70 
1 MAYBE ALMOST BY THE BARREL. 
2 IQ ALL RIGHT. SO WHAT DID YOU DO THEN? 
3 A I SAID ALL RIGHT, YOU KNOW, THE GUY STILL HAD HIM ON THE 
4 GROUND. I WALKED BACK TOWARD THE TRAILER, THIS TRAILER — 
5 Q NOW, LET ME ASK YOU THIS: YOU SAID, ALL RIGHT. 
6 A I SAID, ALL RIGHT. I GOT THE KNIFE AWAY FROM HIM. 
7 Q WHO COULD YOU SEE AT THIS POINT IN TIME? 
8 A NOBODY. I WAS IN THE DARK. BECAUSE, SEE, RIGHT HERE 
9 IT'S DARK. 
10 0 OKAY. 
11 A THE ONLY LIGHT IN THIS TRAILER WAS ONE RIGHT IN THE 
12 CENTER, IT'S A SOFT BULB. THE LIGHT — BESIDES THE OTHER 
13 LIGHTS IN THIS TRAILER THERE, THE LIGHT'S NEVER ON. 
14 Q OKAY. DID YOU E\^ER SEE THESE LIGHTS ON? 
15 A NO. I NEVER SEEN ANYBODY IN THAT TRAILER LOOK OUT 
16 EITHER. 
V Q OKAY. SO YOU SAID YOU HAD ENOUGH. WHAT DID YOU DO? 
18 A I WENT BACK IN THE TRAILER. I SAID, HEY, JUST KEEP HIM 
19 AWAY FROM ME. 
20 Q OKAY. DID YOU HAVE ANYTHING WITH YOU? 
21 A YEAH, I HAD THE WRENCH. NOBODY HAD THE WRENCH -&3^ - ME. 
22 YOU KNOW, THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE FABRICATING. 
23 Q OKAY. SO YOU GO BACK INTO TRAILER NUMBER THREE, IS THAT 
24 RIGHT? 
25 A YES. 
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EXHIBIT C 
INSTRUCTION NO. <573 
The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to 
which each Juror agrees must, of course, be each Jurors own 
conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of fellow 
Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the 
Jurors should examine with candor the questions submitted to them, 
with due regard and deference to the opinions of each other. A 
dissenting Juror should consider whether their state of mind is a 
reasonable one, when it makes no impression on the minds of so nany 
Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent who have heard the name 
evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the 
sanction of the same oath. You are not to give up a conscientious 
conclusion after you have reached such a conclusion finally, but it 
is your duty to confer with your fellow Jurors carefully and 
earnestly, and with a desire to do absolute justice both to the 
State and to the Defendant. 
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EXHIBIT b 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their 
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. It is 
rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, 
to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on the case or to 
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one 
does that at the outset, his sense or pride may be aroused, and he 
may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it 
is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates 
in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the qualify of 
your service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court, 
not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in 
mind that you will make a definite contribution to efficient 
judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. 
To that end, the Court would remind you that in your deliberations 
in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration 
of justice based thereon. 
tlw/3/28 
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EXHIBIT E 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 
The State of Utah and the Defendant both are entitled to the 
individual opinion of every juror. It is the duty of each of you 
after considering all of the evidence in the case, to determine, 
is possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the Defendant. 
When you have reached a conclusion in respect, you should not 
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors 
may have come to a different conclusion. However, each juror 
should freely and fairly discuss with his fellow jurors the 
evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom. If, after doing 
so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached 
by him was wrong, he should abandon that original opinion and 
render his verdict according to his final decision. 
tlw/3/29 
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EXHIBIT F 
A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury. 
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court 
may give an instruction which informs the jury: 
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror 
must agree thereto; 
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one 
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an 
agreement, if it can be done without violence to 
individual j udgment; 
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for 
himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the 
evidence with his fellow jurors' 
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror 
should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change 
his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and 
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest 
conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence 
solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or 
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. 
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been 
unable to agree, the court may require the jury to 
continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an 
instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court 
shall not require or threaten to require the jury to 
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for 
unreasonable intervals. 
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed 
upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable 
probability of agreement. 
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45 North First East 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: (801) 734-9464 EXHIBIT G 
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON WAYNE BROWN, 
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah 
DOB: 12/01/55 
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTEAN, 
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah 
DOB: 11/21/64 
BILLY DONALD CAYER, 
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah 
DOB: 05/12/43 
WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS, 
ADDRESS: Philadelphia, PA 
DOB: 12/25/60 
Defendants. 
INFORMATION 
Criminal No. 
The undersigned, DALE WARD , under oath, states on 
information and belief that the defendants at Box Elder County, 
State of Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
MURDER IN THE 2nd DEGREE, A FELONY OF THE 1st DEGREE, AT: Box 
Elder County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th and 26th, 1989, 
IN VIOLATION OF Section 76-5-203, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), 
TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID THE DEFENDANTS DID, 
INTENDING TO CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO Miguel Rameriz, COMMIT 
AN ACT OR ACTS CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN LIFE, THAT DI^ afiJW<?^ <V//^ V>v * Y> 
THE DEATH OF Miguel Rameriz, OR ACTING UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES 
DEC 2 a 1969 
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INFORMATION - Page Two 
EVIDENCING A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, DID RJ^KOTSSLJ 
ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH CREATED A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO Miguel 
Rameriz AND THEREBY CAUSED THE DEATH OF Miguel Rameriz. 
COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County, 
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section 
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE 
DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip Cabutean DID ATTEMPT, 
WITH UNLAWFUL FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie 
Apodaca AND IN DOING SO DID EITHER INTENTIONALLY CAUSE SERIOUS 
BODILY INJURY TO THE AFORESAID Eddie Apodaca OR DID USE A DEADLY 
WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH OR SERIOUS 
BODILY INJURY. 
COUNT III 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County, 
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section 
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT 
THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip Cabutean DID 
MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR 
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Sherman G. Galardo THROUGH THE 
USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A KNIFE. 
COUNT IV 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County, 
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section 
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT 
THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Don Wayne Brown DID MAKE 
A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR VIOLENCE, 
TO DO BODILYi INJURY TO Richard C. Anderson, THROUGH THE USE OF 
A W&ffl WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OB FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH 
OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A CRESCENT WRENCH. 
-2-
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INFORMATION - Page Three 
COUNT V 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder 
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF 
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON 
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Don Wayne Brown DID 
MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR 
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH THE USE 
OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A KNIFE. 
COUNT VI 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder 
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF 
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON 
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip 
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR 
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Sherman G. Galardo THROUGH THE 
USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A WRENCH. 
COUNT VII 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder 
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF 
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON 
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip 
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE 
FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH 
THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE 
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, NUMCHUCKS. 
COUNT VIII 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder 
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF 
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON 
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip 
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE 
-3-
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Information - Page Four 
FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH 
THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO 
PRODUCE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A WRENCH. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the 
following witnesses: 
SHERMAN G. GALARDO, ERIC TILLEY, RICHARD C. ANDERSON, EDDIE 
APODACA, ROGER OLSEN, JIM SUMMERILL, LYNN YEATES, KENNY ADAMS, 
DALE WARD, MIKE JOHNSON, LARRY/J^HNSTONi, GREG SHEPHERD, DR. GRAY, 
DALE WARD, COMPLAINANT 
AUTHORIZED FOR PRESENTMENT 
AND P1LIN6J 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
ROGER F. BARON, DEPUTY 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
thj 
usL'tiueu etna sworn to ueLutt: uiu 
is 7J7*& of /?*/- 19 fr. 
4l£~~±2-
ROBERT W. DAINES, CIRCUIT JUDGE 
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